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1. CONTEXTUAL DELIBERATION
Cognitive agents often deliberate about preferences among rules.
Consider, for example, an agent with the obligation to travel to
Paris next week leading to a desire to travel by train, with the pref-
erences that if the desire to travel by train cannot be met, then there
is a desire to travel by plane. Such an agent may reason about pref-
erences among rules as follows:
• The rule leading to a desire to travel by train is preferred to
the rule leading to a desire to travel by plane, maybe as a
second alternative.
The train rule may even be replaced by the plane rule, an example
of rule revision, maybe due to experienced train delays.
Since such preferences among rules and rule revisions only hold
within some contexts, we refer to this kind of reasoning as contex-
tual deliberation. It is a powerful level of abstraction, which can
be used to describe a new class of patterns of the coordination of
interaction. Such interactions patterns are represented by rule pri-
orities (e.g., obligations override desires or intentions – for social
agents) [1, 6] rule conversions (e.g., obligations behave as desires –
for norm internalizing agents) [4], and so on. Consider, for exam-
ple, an agent which is called social when it prefers its obligations
over its desires, and selfish when it prefers its desires over its obli-
gations (e.g., in the BOID architecture [1]). The following is an
example of contextual deliberation:
• In some circumstances, social agents turn into selfish agents,
maybe when the agent does not have sufficient resources.
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To support contextual deliberation, in this paper we introduce a
defeasible logic expressing ordered preferences over different op-
tions for contextualising non-nested rules. For example, in the logic
proposed in this paper we may have meta-rules such as the follow-
ing: r : a⇒C (r′ : b⇒OBL c)⊗¬(r′′ : d⇒INT f ⊗ g). Intuitively,
meta-rule r states that, under the condition a, we should infer rule r′
stating that c is obligatory if b is the case; however, if this rule is
violated (i.e., if, given b we obtain ¬c) then the second choice is to
derive the negation of rule r′′, which would imply to intend f , as a
first choice, or g as a second choice, if d is the case.
Our logic builds on extensions of defeasible logic for program-
ming deliberation and meta-deliberation tasks with, amongst oth-
ers, rule types, preferences [4], actions [3, 4] and nested rules [8].
It is based on the following assumptions:
Modalities: the system develops a constructive account of modali-
ties corresponding to mental states and obligations, in the sense that
rules devise the logical conditions for introducing them. Modal-
ities may have a different logical behaviour, as illustrated by the
special role played by belief rules, which permit to derive only un-
modalised literals, whereas the other rule types allow for deriving
modalised conclusions [4, 6, 3].
Conversions: possible conversions of a modality into another can
occur. For example, the applicability of rule leading to derive OBLp
(p is obligatory) may permit, under appropriate conditions, to ob-
tain INTp (p is intended) [4, 6].
Preferences: preferences can be expressed in two ways: using
standard priority relation over rules and the operator ⊗. Opera-
tor ⊗ [5] applies to literals [3] as well as to rules, and captures the
idea of violation. A ⊗-sequence such as α⊗β ⊗ γ means that α is
preferred, but if α is violated, then β is preferred; if β is violated,
then the third choice is γ .
Meta-rules: meta-rules permit to reason about rules for deriving
goals. This is the main device for contextualising the provability of
goals and requires to introduce nested rules.
The definitions of the deliberation logics developed in this paper
are more complex than the definitions of temporal logics tradition-
ally used in agent based software engineering for specification and
verification, since they contain rules, preferences, non-monotonic
proof system, and so on. However, deliberation logics have to be
efficient – with at most linear complexity (in the number of rules),
whereas traditional temporal logics have a relatively high compu-
tational complexity. Moreover, interaction patterns in such tempo-
ral logics have focussed on a relatively small class of agent types
such as, for example, kinds of realism and commitment strategies
in BDI-CTL [2, 7], whereas a much broader class is studied in the
deliberation logics.
Due to space limitations, we focus only on the formal aspects of
the new logic.
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2. DEFEASIBLE LOGIC
We extend the language of Defeasible Logic with the modal op-
erators INT, DES and OBL, and the non-classical connective ⊗.
Accordingly, if l is a literal and X a modal operator, then Xl and
¬Xl are modal literals (we will use L and MLit to denote the sets
of literals and modal literals). If l1, . . . , ln, n ≥ 1, are literals, then
we will say that l1⊗·· ·⊗ ln is an ⊗-expression.
2.1 Contextual agent theory
We divide the rules into atomic rules and meta-rules, where atomic
rules are again divided into rules for beliefs, desires, intentions, and
obligations. For rule index X ∈ {C,BEL,DES, INT,OBL}, where
{BEL,DES, INT,OBL} is the set of modalities and C stands for
contextual or meta-rules, we have that φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ is a strict
rule such that whenever the premises φ1, . . . ,φn are indisputable so
is the conclusion ψ . φ1, . . . ,φn ⇒X ψ is a defeasible rule that can
be defeated by contrary evidence. φ1, . . . ,φn ;X ψ is a defeater
that is used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence
to the contrary. The premises of rules, i.e., φ1, . . . ,φn, are liter-
als or modal literals, while ψ , the consequent, is (i) a literal for
strict atomic rules; (ii) an atomic rule for a strict meta-rule; (iii) an
⊗-expression for defeasible atomic rules and atomic defeaters and
(iv) a ⊗-rule for defeasible meta-rules and meta-defeaters, where,
if r1, . . . ,rn, r ≥ 1, are atomic rules, then, r1⊗·· ·⊗ rn is a ⊗-rule.
Finally we will admit negation of rules, thus if r is an atomic rule,
then ¬r is a rule.
A contextual agent theory consists of a set of facts or indis-
putable statements, a set of rules for beliefs, a set of meta-rules,
a superiority or priority relation > among rules saying when one
rule may override the conclusion of another rule, and a conversion
function c saying when a rule of one type can be used also as an-
other type. Belief rules are the reasoning core of the agent. Rules
for goals (desires, intentions, and obligations) are viewed in any
theory as meta-rules with an empty antecedent and a consequent
consisting of a ⊗-sequence of rules for goals.
DEFINITION 1. A contextual agent theoryD is a structure
(F,RBEL,RC,>,c) where F ⊆ L ∪MLit is a finite set of facts,
RBEL ⊆ RuleBEL, RC ⊆ RuleC, >⊆ Rule×Rule, the superiority
relation is a binary relation over the set of rules, c, the conversion,
is a binary relation over the set of modalities.
For readability reasons, we omit defeasible arrows for defeasible
nested-rules r⇒C with the empty body. That is, a defeasible nested
rule⇒C (p→INT q) will be just represented as p→INT q.
2.2 Incompatible rules
In this section we define when two rules are incompatible. We
use some abbreviations, such as superscript for mental attitude or
meta-rule, subscript for type of rule, and Rule[φ ] for rules whose
consequent is φ , thus, for example RuleBELsd is the set of strict and
defeasible rules of type BEL, Rules[ψ] is the set of strict rules
whose consequent is ψ , and RuleCd [r] denotes the set of defeasible
meta-rules whose conclusion is the atomic rule r. We use r1, . . . ,rn
to label (or name) rules, A(r) to denote the set {φ1, . . . ,φn} of an-
tecedents of the rule r, and C(r) to denote the consequent of the
rule r. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that ci = q, R[ci = q] and
rXd [ci = q] denote, respectively, the set of rules and a defeasible
rule of type X with the head ⊗ni=1ci such that ci = q.
DEFINITION 2. Let r ∈Rule be a non-nested rule and∈ {→,
⇒,;}. The set Sub(r) of sub-rules is defined as follows:
- Sub(r) = {A(r)X ⊗ ji=1ai|C(r) =⊗ni=1ai, j ≤ n}, if r is atomic
- Sub(r) = {¬(A(r)X ⊗ ji=1ai)|C(r) =⊗ni=1ai, j ≤ n}, otherwise
E.g., given r : (a→INT b⊗c), Sub(r) = {a→INT b,a→INT b⊗c}.
DEFINITION 3. Given an atomic rule r, the modal free rule L(r)
of r is obtained by removing all modal operators in A(r).
For example, given r : INTa→INT b, L(r) is r : a→INT b.
DEFINITION 4. Let D be a contextual agent theory and rX ∈
Rule a non-nested rule. The set RC〈rX 〉 of supporting rules for
rX in RC is:
- if rX ∈ Ruleatom and ∀a ∈ A(r) : a = Xb ∈MLit,
RC〈rX 〉= ⋃
sX ∈Sub(rX )
(
RC[ci = sX ]∪ ⋃
Y :c(Y,X)
RC[ci =L(sY )]
)
- otherwise RC〈rX 〉= ⋃
∀sX ∈Sub(rX )
RC[ci = sX ]
For example, a meta-rule⇒C (a⇒INT b⊗c)⊗(a⇒INT d) supports
the following rules: (a⇒INT b), (a⇒INT b⊗ c), and (a⇒INT d).
DEFINITION 5. Let D be a contextual agent theory. The max-
imal provable-rule-sets of non-nested rules that are possibly prov-
able in D is, for X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL},
- RPX = {Sub(ci)|C(r) =⊗ni=1 ci,r ∈ RC}∪
{Sub(L(cYi ))|∀Y such that c(Y,X),C(r) =⊗ni=1cXi ,
r ∈ RC, and ∀a ∈ A(r) : a = Xb ∈MLit}
- RPBEL = {Sub(r)|r ∈ RBEL}.
DEFINITION 6. Two non-nested rules r and r′ are incompatible
iff r′ is an incompatible atomic rule of r or r′ is an incompatible
negative rule of r.
1) r′ is an incompatible atomic rule of r iff r and r′ are atomic rules
and A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =
⊗n
i=1 ai and C(r
′) =
⊗m
i=1 bi, such that
∃ j, 1≤ j ≤ n,m, a j =∼b j and, ∀ j′ ≤ j, a j′ = b j′ .
2) r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r iff either r or r′ is not an
atomic rule and A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =
⊗n
i=1 ai and C(r
′) =
⊗m
i=1 bi,
such that N = min{n,m},∀ j ≤ N,a j = b j.
DEFINITION 7. Let D be a contextual agent theory and r a non-
nested rule. The set of all possible incompatible rules for rX is:
IC(rX ) = {r′|r′ ∈ RPX , r′ is incompatible with rX }
2.3 Proofs and proof rules
Let X ∈ {C,BEL,DES, INT,OBL}. Proofs are sequences of lit-
erals and modal literals together with so-called proof tags +∆, −∆,
+∂ and −∂ . Given a defeasible agent theory D, +∆X q means that
literal q is provable in D using only facts and strict rules for X ,
−∆X q means that it has been proved in D that q is not definitely
provable in D, +∂X q means that q is defeasibly provable in D, and
−∂X q means that it has been proved in D that q is not defeasibly
provable in D.
DEFINITION 8. Let # ∈ {∆,∂}, P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a proof
in a contextual agent theory D, and X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}. A lit-
eral q∈ L or a rule r ∈Rule are #-provable in P if there is an initial
sequence P(1), . . . ,P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) = +#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) = +#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) =−#X p or
4. rX is a rule in RPX and P(m) = +#CrX ;
A literal q ∈ L or a rule r ∈ Rule are #-rejected in P if there is an
initial sequence P(1), . . . ,P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) =−#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) =−#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) = +#X p or
4. rX is a rule in RPX and P(m) =−#CrX .
DEFINITION 9. Let D be a contextual agent theory. Applicable
rules and discarded rules are defined as follows:
1. A rule r ∈ RBEL∪RC is applicable iff ∀a ∈ A(r):
if a ∈ L then +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n), and
if a = Xb ∈MLit then +∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
2. A rule r ∈ R[ci = q] is applicable in the condition for ±∂X iff
r ∈ RXatom and ∀a ∈ A(r): if a ∈ L then +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n), and
if a = Zb ∈MLit then +∂Za ∈ P(1..n), or
r ∈ RYatom and c(Y,X) ∈ c and ∀a ∈ A(r): +∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
3. A rule r is discarded in the condition for ±∂X iff either:
if r ∈ RBEL∪RC∪RX then either ∃a∈ A(r) :−∂BELa∈ P(1..n)
or ∃Xb ∈ A(R), Xb ∈MLit and −∂X b ∈ P(1..n);
if r ∈ RY , then ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
Before providing proof procedures to derive rules, let us intro-
duce specific proof tags for this purpose. For  ∈ {→,⇒,;},
±∆CrX means that rule r ∈ RX is (is not) definitely provable us-
ing meta-rules; ±∂CrX means that rule r ∈ RX is (is not) defeasi-
bly provable using meta-rules. In general, ±∆XC and ±∂XC mean,
respectively, definitive (non-)provability of rules for X , and defea-
sible (non-)provability of rules for X .
Finally we give proof procedures to derive rules. In this per-
spective, however, we have to be careful, as we can distinguish
between strict and defeasible derivations of non-nested strict and
defeasible rules. Given a contextual agent theory D, a non-nested
rule r is strictly provable in D when it is strictly derived using a
meta-rule such as a→C r. A rule r is defeasibly provable in D
when it is defeasibly derived using a meta-rule such as a→C r and
a⇒C r. When a strict atomic rule a→INT b is defeasibly derived,
it acts as a defeasible rule a⇒INT b. Proof procedures for the strict
derivation of atomic rules in a contextual cognitive agent theory
D = (F,RBEL,RC,>,c) are as follows.1
+∆XC : If P(i+1) = +∆Cr
X then
1) X = BEL and rX ∈ RBEL or
2) ∃s ∈ RCs 〈rX 〉 ∀a ∈ A(s) a is ∆-provable.
For defeasible derivations of rules the conditions are as follows.
+∂XC : If P(n+1) = +∂Cr
X , then
1) +∆CrX ∈ P(1..n), or
2.1) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(rX ), ∀r′ ∈ RCs 〈r′′〉, r′ is discarded and
.2) ∃t ∈ RC〈ci = rX 〉 such that
.1) ∀i′ < i, ci′ is applicable,
.2) ∀i′ < i, C(ci′) =
⊗n
k=1 bk, s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼bk ∈ P(1..n),
.3) t is applicable, and
.3) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(rX ),∀s ∈ RC〈di = r′′〉
.1) if ∀i′ < i, di′ is applicable,
C(di′) =
⊗n
k=1 ak s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼ak ∈ P(1..n), then
.1) s is discarded, or
.2) ∃z ∈ RC〈pi = r′′′〉 such that r′′′ ∈ IC(C(s)) such that
∀i′ < i, pi′ is applicable, and
C(pi′) =
⊗n
k=1 dk s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼dk ∈ P(1..n) and
z is applicable and z > s.
Given the above proof conditions for deriving rules, the follow-
ing are the procedures for proving literals. Notice that each time a
rule r is used and applied, we are required to check that r is prov-
able.
1Due to space limitations we omit the proof conditions for −∆ and
−∂ . They are the constructive negation of the corresponding pos-
itive conditions; i.e., the negative condition is obtained from the
positive one swapping ∀ and ∃, conjunctions and disjunctions and
changing the signs of the proof tags.
+∆X : If P(i+1) = +∆X q then
1) Xq ∈ F , or q ∈ F if X = BEL, or
2) ∃r ∈ RuleXs [q] : +∆Cr and ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆-provable or
3) ∃r ∈ RuleYs [q] : +∆Cr, ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆-provable and c(Y,X).
+∂X : If P(n+1) = +∂X q then
1)+∆X q ∈ P(1..n) or
2.1) −∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) and
.2) ∃r ∈ Rulesd [ci = q] such that +∂Cr, r is applicable, and
∀i′ < i, +∂BEL∼ci′ ∈ P(1..n); and
.3) ∀s ∈ Rule[c j =∼q], either −∂Cs, or s is discarded, or
∃ j′ < j such that −∂BEL∼c j′ ∈ P(1..n), or
.1) ∃t ∈ Rule[ck = q] such that +∂Ct, t is applicable and
∀k′ < k, +∂BEL∼ck′ ∈ P(1..n) and t > s.
3. SUMMARY
The basic deliberative process uses rules to derive goals (desires,
intentions, obligations) based on existing beliefs, desires, intentions
and obligations (beliefs concern the knowledge an agent has about
the world: they are not in themselves motivations for action). Con-
textualising the deliberation requires to provide the agent with a
mechanism for reasoning with rules, which are conditioned to some
additional factors. In the simplest case, this can be done by adding
such factors as new antecedents of the rules to be contextualised.
But transformations may be problematic when complex reasoning
patterns are considered. We therefore extend Defeasible Logic to
deal with the contextual deliberation process of cognitive agents.
First, we introduce meta-rules to reason with rules. Meta-rules are
rules that have, as a consequent, rules to derive goals (obligations,
intentions and desires): in other words, meta-rules include nested
rules. Second, we introduce explicit preferences among rules to
capture complex structures where nested rules can be involved in
scenarios where rules are violated. The main challenge in the for-
mal definition is to introduce a notion of compatibility between
rules, for which we have given one possible solution in this paper,
based on a subtle introduction of negated rules. Further research
are the development of a methodology to use the language, and a
formal analysis of the logic.
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